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Abstract 
A transition to a Circular economy depends on the development of circular business 
models. Extant research suggests the need for business to cooperate broadly to address 
sustainability issues of a systemic nature. Thus this paper seeks to explore and explain 
how business and public actors work together to develop circular business models. We 
conduct a longitudinal case study of coordination and cooperation between city planners 
and private developers for vehicle access-without-ownership provision for residents in an 
area they are planning together. Drawing on an understanding of coordination and 
cooperation as contingent on its institutional context, we show how frictions between 
rules, norms and understandings pervade efforts at deciding on value creation and 
capture. Thus we contribute to the understanding of circular business model development 
in general and public-private development in particular.  
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The Circular economy is gaining popularity among business leaders and policy makers, 
particularly in the EU (Geissdoerfer et al., 2017), referring to attempts to go beyond 
prevailing, linear, take-make-waste resource and product flows for an economy that is 
“restorative and regenerative by design and provides benefits for business, society, and 
the environment” (Ellen MacArthur Foundation (EMAF), 2017, p. 22). A transition to a 
Circular economy depends on its implementation within business, thus circular business 
models (CBMs) need to be developed (Pieroni, McAloone and Pigosso, 2019). 
CBMs are suggested to create and capture value by turning products into services (Tukker, 
2015; Corvellec and Stål, 2017), narrowing, slowing or closing resource flows (Bocken et 
al., 2016), or by “utilizing economic value retained in products after use in the production 
of new offerings” (Linder and Williander, 2017, p. 183). Yet, because CBMs also aim for 
integrated environmental, social and economic value creation (Bocken et al., 2014), and 
thereby address issues of a systemic nature, research is increasingly stressing the 
importance engaging for business to engage with stakeholders beyond those typically 
found in value chains and industries (Fehrer and Wieland, 2021). For instance favorable 
regulation and public policies are important for the success of CBMs (Corvellec and Stål, 
2019) and public actors, such as cities, are also important drivers of CBM development in 
sectors such as infrastructure and housing where they are the ones to initiate, plan and 
procure business activities. Nonetheless, so far we know little of how business develop 
CBMs together public partners, although this is becoming more common (Christensen, 
2021) and if effective, engagements could speed up CBM development, which despite its 
suggested benefits, is lagging (Tura et al., 2019). Subsequently, in this paper we seek to 
explore and explain how business and public actors work together to develop CBMs.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Circular economy and circular business model development 
Definitions of CBMs diverge, but they can be distinguished through their underlying 
principles for value creation and capture, two key dimensions of any business model 
(Teece, 2010). Here Tukker (2015), among others, draws on the vast product-service 
systems literature to showcase how circularity involves turning products into services, as 
in providing customers with access, via leasing, lending, sharing and pooling, and not 
ownership. Several others also make use of the business model canvas (Osterwalder and 
Pigneur, 2010) to suggest different CBM-types (e.g., Lewandowski, 2016).  
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Among product-services systems, providing access instead of ownership is an oft 
mentioned CBM-type, where product ownership is retained with the producer or an 
intermediate provider, e.g., a provider of a car pool. These models are assumed to extend 
and increase the utilization of products and thus replace the purchase of new ones, and 
thereby curb the energy, material and waste that goes into virgin production. Moreover, 
when customers lease rather than own products they pay the cost of their usage and tend 
to use products less, which has environmental benefits for such products, e.g., fossil cars, 
that have their impacts during use. Lastly, when ownership is retained, and products are 
not dispersed among customers, it can be easier to recycle or remanufacture them, their 
materials and components, as they remain with firms. Providing access instead of 
ownership is particularly important for the product exemplified in this case study, namely 
fossil cars. Business models that provide the sharing instead of owning of cars have been 
around for some time, and mounting evidence suggests that these CBMs provide 
environmental benefits (Amatuni et al., 2020).  
Besides seeking to define what CBMs are, there is a growing agreement that CBM 
development call for joint action among broader groups of stakeholders (Fehrer and 
Wieland, 2021). For one resource flows extend beyond the reach of single firms (Bocken, 
Schuit and Kraaijenhagen, 2018; Parida et al., 2019), and thus closing loops call for 
coordination and cooperation, even among competitors (Manzhynski and Figge, 2019). 
Such interactions can reduce the risks and uncertainties that accompany CBM 
development (Brown et al., 2021), so that by adjusting several business models a new 
offer is made possible (Hellstrom et al., 2015) and systemic change is enabled (Perey, 
Benn and Edwards, 2018).  
Importantly, the systemic nature of the sustainability issues that CBMs pertain to address 
also demands, and enables, forms of collective action that go beyond business 
ecosystems (Fehrer and Wieland, 2021). It demands such action because CBM 
development needs both policy support and regulatory adjustment, for instance car pools 
severely depend on whether the cities in which they operate subsidize, or neglect, their 
parking needs (Bocken et al., 2020). But equally important is also that CBM development 
enables cross-sectoral cooperation because they align business goals with those of policy 
makers, and increasingly so as Circular economy policies are proliferating. For instance, in 
the example of car pools, city planners have recently begun to set aside space and 
subsidies in the plans made for new residential areas, increasingly promoting car pools 
while problematizing the use of private cars. Thus CBM development suggests 
interactions between “partners [that] might be quite different from ‘conventional’ value 
chain partners” (Bocken et al., (2018, p. 82).  
Cooperation and coordination  
To advance knowledge of public and private CBM development we review research into 
collaboration, coordination and cooperation, three terms that have been used 
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interchangeably to understand inter-organizational relationships (Cropper et al., 2009; 
Gulati, Wohlgezogen and Zhelyazkov, 2012; Castañer and Oliveira, 2020). Somewhat 
simplified these terms refer to interactions that differ from the arm-length market 
transactions between buyers and sellers, and from the hierarchal relations between 
owners and subsidiaries. Instead they entail communication, trust and commitment 
(Hardy, Phillips and Thomas B. Lawrence, 2003) but also asymmetric power, negotiation 
and conflict (Hardy and Phillips, 1998). The importance of joint goals are often stressed, 
although Cropper et al., (2009) observe that partners typically have mixed motives.   
Because we are interested in interactions between private and public partners we draw 
on Castañer and Oliveira (2020) who assume a broad focus in their efforts to clearly 
define the meaning of collaboration, cooperation and coordination. They stress the 
importance of the goals that partners jointly set, as few partnership proceed without first 
having agreed upon goals to strive for, and suggest that goal setting and goal 
implementation are two distinct parts of inter-organizational relationships, demarcated 
by time. They refer to the former as coordination, and the latter as cooperation.  
Nonetheless, both coordination and cooperation are assumed to be dynamic, as much 
about sharing of resources and mutual learning as they are about political maneuvering 
(Hardy, Phillips and Lawrence, 2003). Here extant research has stressed the need to 
consider the institutional context in which coordination and cooperation take place – the 
rules, norms and understandings partners perceive and enact – to explain events.  
Institutional context 
To analyze such contexts we turn to institutional theory, where institutions are historically 
entrenched patterns of behavior that have acquired the “status of taken for granted facts 
which, in turn, shape future interactions and negotiations” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997: 99). 
They are made up of rules, norms and understandings that, depending on how coherent 
and structured an institution is, may be more or less aligned (Stål, Bonnedahl and 
Eriksson, 2015). Rules refer to legal regulations that are backed up by the coercive 
potential of the state, thus rule-based prescriptions of stakeholders’ rights and 
responsibilities come with a threat of legal sanction (Hoffman, 1999). Norms refer to the 
values that prevail in a context, what is considered right or morally appropriate (Maguire 
and Hardy, 2009). These can be embedded in professional values or codes of conduct 
(Scott, 2008), but recently sustainability has emerged as a new powerful moral theme 
among organizations, one that defines what is morally legitimate to do (Hengst et al., 
2020). Lastly with beliefs institutionalists refer to the culturally-cognitive, “shared 
conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality” (Scott, 2001: 57). Thus 
understandings are often taken-for-granted and unquestioned as they describe deep-
seated assumptions of how the world, or a particular industry (Stål, Bonnedahl and 
Eriksson, 2013), works and why (Hoffman, 1999). Such understandings are ontological, 
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and thus they form the basis of pragmatic legitimacy, what actors believe can be done. 
Understandings appear as facts, so that their socially constructed origin is hid from view.  
When rules, norms and understandings align they effectively stabilize and reproduce 
roles, relationships and practices in the domains in which they prevail, maintaining an 
“iron cage” that positions stakeholders and interests, in other words, the world appears 
as it is and should be (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However as elements are always 
somewhat heterogeneous (Greenwood et al., 2011), there is room for dynamics, 
prompting actors to reflect upon the state of their practices, interests and ambitions 
(Garud, Hardy and Maguire, 2007). From an institutional perspective such reflections are 
signs that rules, norms and understandings have become misaligned or contradictory, 
causing institutional friction (Fehrer and Wieland, 2021). For instance, contradictions can 
appear as functional gaps (Stål and Corvellec, 2021), where some institutional elements, 
for instance the laws that prevail, appear incapable of achieving treasured results (Seo 
and Creed, 2002). Contradictions motivate stakeholders to seek out change. A case in 
point are social and environmental objectives, increasingly seen as morally appropriate 
within business yet contradictory and misaligned with perceptions of how markets work 
(Hahn et al., 2014). For instance, policy makers are not susceptible to market pressures in 
the same way as commercial businesses are, and therefore perceive social and 
environmental objectives from the perspective of political, instead of market, interest 
(Stål, Bonnedahl and Eriksson, 2013).       
In conclusion, to explore and explain how business and public actors work together to 
develop CBMs we apply a conceptual frame that:  
1) Acknowledges value creation and value capture as two key dimensions of CBMs 
2) Distinguishes between coordination and cooperation.  
3) Analyses effects of rules, norms and understandings.  
METHOD 
To explore and explain how business and public actors work together to develop CBMs we 
followed the advice of Flyvbjerg (2006) who argues that case studies are imperative for 
providing deep and contextual insights into less explored, dynamic and processual 
phenomena. Our pre-knowledge of the housing sector led us to believe that this 
constituted an empirical setting with much public and private cooperation in a highly 
structured, ut also problematized, institutional context.  
A CBM for residential mobility  
Our case refers to public-private CBM development undertaken in Burg, a fast growing, 
anonymized, medium-sized city in Sweden. Here civil servants from Burg’s planning 
departments (planners), and representatives from seven (7) real-estate and construction 
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firms (developers) are jointly planning, from scratch, Burg’s largest residential 
development project, Santalodge. Santalodge is to contain 3000 apartments and 70000 
square meters of workplaces and to be built in three stages between 2024 and 2030. 
Partners’ cooperation is unusually close as planning is usually solely done by cities. 
Coordination began already 2017 when planners and developers jointly set a vision and 
goals for the area, and we followed cooperation through interviews and observations 
between 2019 and 2021.    
One of the most difficult issues for these partners has been the goal to provide reduce 
residents’ dependence on owning cars. For this goal providing vehicle access-without-
ownership services is key. Access to vehicles such as electric cars, electric bikes and cargo 
bikes, along with digital mobility-as-a-service prescriptions, are to enable residents to live 
without cars, and instead make room for Santalodge’s children, pedestrians and bikers, to 
reduce CO2 emissions and city congestion and to improve Burg’s poor air quality. Through 
cooperation it is decided that these circular services are to be physically located in 
mobility hubs, multi-functional facilities that also provide private parking space. To 
implement the goal, partners repeatedly stress their quest of finding an appropriate 
business model that can integrate their sustainability aspirations with what is perceived 
economically viable. This has proven Santalodge’s most important and difficult task, 
perceived equivalent to trying to “make hash out of an elephant”.  
Data collection 
We collected our via 51 interviews and 32 meeting observations and used Santalodge’s 
documents (deposited at Share point) to verify our interpretations. All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. Observed meetings were of three different types: 
Project meetings open to all participants, Mobility meetings open to ten (10) participants 
devoted especially to hubs and mobility, and Business model-meetings, open to the two 
project leaders (planners X1 and X2), three particularly involved developers (Y1-3) and 
their coordinator (YC). The Mobility and Business model-meetings were observed by the 
first author, because they were confidential he could not record them but nevertheless 
managed to transcribe large parts of them verbatim.  
We asked respondents to explain the rules, norms and understandings they perceived, 
but as understandings are difficult for respondents to accurately describe, we also asked 
them to describe their interests, what they did and why, and how they explained the 
various happening. While our interviews provided us with a rich contextual 
understanding, our meeting observations gave us a first-hand experience of cooperation, 
as in particular norms and understandings “played out” during the lengthy efforts to nail 
down value creation and capture.  
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Data analysis 
Following the recommendation of Eisenhardt (1989) we wrote up a case description, to 
provide initial insights among us. We also constructed a rough time-line over project 
events, enabling us to demarcate coordination from cooperation. As goals were clearly 
formulated in Santalodge’s Sustainability program, we defined coordination (goal setting) 
as the activities resulting in the program, while cooperation meant when partners worked 
together on the legally binding plans that would turn goals into “built environment”. We 
divided data excerpts into those that referred to coordination and those that referred to 
cooperation, e.g., talk about how goals were set, why they mattered, and how they 
related to planning as such were coded as “coordination” and talk about details of hubs, 
their costs and practicalities, were coded as “cooperation”.  
We then embarked on a new theory-driven coding as we looked for excerpts that referred 
to rules, norms and understandings within coordination and cooperation respectively. For 
instance, we coded any talk about the Swedish building law as an example of how rules 
were perceived and enacted, talk about environmental and social issues as examples of 
norms. After some consideration we decided that the recurring statements, primarily 
from developers, of “bringing the market to the table” (Y8) or stressing costs and 
economic viability, were best seen as examples of taken-for-granted understandings, both 
among planners and developers of how the housing world works. Even if these 
statements clearly had a normative side to them, especially in their implications, we 
found it better to consider them examples of what institutionalists label understandings 
as they seemed so taken-for-granted and ontological in nature. Having listened to 
respondents throughout multiple meetings and hours of transcribed recordings we 
realized that they were simply describing what they perceived as “economic realities”, the 
world as they perceived it to be, not necessarily the world as they wanted it to be.  
FINDINGS 
Coordination 
Rules – Burg’s planning monopoly. Santalodge came about as a group of 
developers approached Burg’s politicians with the idea to turn the forest at Santalodge 
into a “sustainability profiled” residential area, which was timely, as politicians were 
contemplating new ways of working with developers. Politicians and planners perceived 
that the planning monopoly that the Swedish building law gave them, was not enough to 
achieve sustainability outcomes. Developers knew this: “[Y]ou're not forced to build 
anything. The zoning plan is about what you can do. It doesn’t mean you have to do it.” 
The law only grants the right to determine what can be built, not to actually get it built. 
There has to be developers that are interested, otherwise “nothing gets built” (Y9). 
Sometimes developers will secure building permits only to turn around and protest that 
they cannot follow plans and build. And as X5 explains:  
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Then we're not able to say: no, you're wrong, because we can't force them to build 
something they can't sell. And it happens sometimes that they come and say something like 
that. And then we have to decide if we really want the houses to be built, then we might 
have to redo the zoning plan. We don't want to because it takes a lot of energy.  
 
Another possibility is cheating:  
They don't trust us because [planners] want to control [building] materials and other things. 
In some way, they are right. I do understand them because there are many builders in 
Sweden who have done awful buildings, awful really (Y12). 
 
 Rules - land allocation. There are also laws regulating land sales, cities have 
much freedom to decide how they sell their land, Burg can decide rather freely which 
developer will get what piece of land. Thus for developers joining forces seemed as a way 
to access land to build on. Y3 explains: “[T]his is a lot of land […] if we get one project or 
one land plot then we will be satisfied. If we don’t get that of course we will not be 
satisfied.” Planners know that in a growing city like Burg, land is precious: “[I]t is very 
important for them [to] get the land. Or if they get to build 50 apartments or 500. It's very 
important for each company. In [City], which is a growing city, many companies want to 
build. So which ones should we pick to get the chance to build?” 
Yet even these rules do not grant planners with full control because land deals do not 
effect building permits, there are recognized loopholes, as Y9 explains:  
And Building Permits, that department, can only look at the laws and regulations, they can't 
look at land allocation, the contract. So I think in Burg and other cities there's been a lot of 
times that people said, company said: ‘I will do this, and I will do that.’ And then nothing 
happened. They just built a regular box house. And the problem here is that is hard to 
regulate. 
 
Thus despite rules, politicians and planners perceived frustration in being able to realize 
their plans. In Beach, a previous, now finished project, planners wanted social and 
environmental qualities, but Beach turned out a failure, as a Burg politician explains: 
“[W]hen [developers] got their land plots, they went away from [agreements]. […] And 
that area doesn't look good.” Even worse, developers complained about the zoning plans 
and got them changed, something which costs planners time, money and prestige.  
Thus, even before coordination for Santalodge began, politicians and planners had 
realized that rules did not enable them to get the sustainability results they wanted. 
Seemingly there was a functional gap between what institutionalized rules enabled and 
what their sustainability aspirations implied. Looking at developments around Sweden 
they saw an array of social and environmental quality improvements being made in new 
housing projects, just not in Burg.  
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Norms – sustainability. Functional gaps seemed propelled by norms emerging in 
the Swedish construction sector that both planners and developers perceived. Y6 explains 
“Sustainability is such a big question now in every company” and Y2 knew that: “If there is 
a sustainability project somewhere in Sweden then the CEO goes there for the first dig or 
to cut the ribbon”.  
Thus the rather unique decision was made to allow developers to partake in 
planning Santalodge and setting its sustainability goals, as politicians, planners, and 
developers participated in City lab, a an externally driven one year program. Here 
partners translated 17 SDGs into a five goals for Santalodge, and wrote them into the 
Sustainability program, a 48-page document signed by Burg’s major. During the work it 
became apparent that developers had rather vague notions of sustainability, stating “we 
see this is education, you see this as a chance to try this and engage in the participation 
may give some benefits”. Planner X1 had to admit that “three fourths were written by civil 
servants from the municipality and one forth was written by developers”. Burg, on the 
other hand, had worked much with sustainability, in particular with mobility, and the goal 
to decrease car dependency ended up in the program, where it was stated that all 
residents should “become members of car pools” and thereby be “highly mobile without 
having to own a car” (Sustainability program, 2018, p. 28). Cars, in turn, should be parked 
in joint facilities, referred to as “mobility hubs”. Thus already in goal setting it was clear 
that Santalodge should enable vehicle access-without-ownership for its residents and 
contain “mobility hubs”.     
.  
That car reduction was perceived very differently between planners and developers was 
soon realized, as traffic planner Y14 explains:  
One example was that in the beginning a lot of developers, and their coordinator, jointly 
said that ‘ If we can reduce family car ownership from two to one then we have achieved a 
lot’. […] I had to ask my statisticians to dig up numbers that showed that it is more common 
in Burg for families to own zero cars than to have two.  
 
Nonetheless, partners managed to set joint goals because they explicitly choose to just 
focus on what was desirable, to entirely disregard how they were going to achieve it. 
After coordination, hopes seemed high, and perhaps, naïve: 
Stated from both sides: we're willing to put working with sustainability first and try to find 
the business models and the win-win solutions afterwards. […] But there are not many 
conflicting goals between companies, and with us, the municipality. Because right now at 
least, we have an agreement […] That is our sustainability program (X1).  
 
Thus Santalodge ended up with an ambitious goal to reduce cars via car- and vehicle pools 
and mobility hubs, an ambition that aligned with planners wishes but seemed unfamiliar 
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to developers. To implement this goal, they hoped to, somehow, bring forth “win-win 
solutions afterwards”.  
Cooperation 
In 2018 implementation began by inscribing goals into the legally binding plan documents, 
e.g., the maps and texts, that according to the law governs any construction. Things now 
grew more problematic. Now the sustainability norm, expressed in the goal to reduce 
cars, came in full confrontation with the understandings of developers. Developers now 
began to (Y9) “bring the market to the table” and problematize things:  
I mean, if I have a good location I will sell all of apartments. That will always work. It’s 
location, location, location, you know, the first course in real estate. This location isn't A, it’s 
probably B. […] But the biggest problem is that it's 3000 apartments. 50% is rental and 50% 
is condominium. (Y2) 
 
Developers tried to make sure that there would be room for cars in Santalodge, as they 
believed that buyers would want that. Y2 had learnt that “they just do not buy the 
apartments if parking is not convenient” and planners also grew more ambivalent: 
“People [may] not want to live here if there is no possibility to park a car. [This is not] 
central Stockholm or Gothenburg. [We have another ] challenge [in Burg].” 
Thus a new type of institutional friction arose, between how sustainability norms were 
expressed, and how the housing market was understood. In 2019 this friction became 
apparent to all, as an argument over how close car parking should be broke out. Conflicts 
temporary halted planning for months, but as one planner left in protest and a new one 
(X2) took over, a special “business model group” was formed. Here a more focused search 
for a business model began, with less planners and developers involved. Y1 explained to 
the others the challenge the group faced: “Yes, you can say it is difficult, it is damn 
difficult, but we are working on it”.  
Thus more focused discussions regarding value creation and capture emerged as issues 
became more challenging. These discussions were both as a direct outcome of the goals 
set (to have car pools and mobility hubs) but also sought as a way to align conflicting 
views, as X2 explained: “We need a compromise, somewhere in between”.  
 Value creation. The CBM was to create value for residents by facilitating 
convenient daily travel to and from the area without relying on cheap, convenient and 
plentiful parking spaces that residents rent on a monthly basis. Parking spaces create 
“linear” value as they presuppose, and facilitates, the buying and ownership of private 
cars. With mobility hubs, parking is instead restricted and located further from residents. 
In parallel, space is made for vehicle pools, with cars, cargo- and electrical bikes, with the 
intent that residents can use these when they need to transport things or people. While 
car pools and parking could have been separated, as planners initially wanted, one 
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outcome of the previously mentioned conflict was that they would be co-located in the 
hubs, in other words, car pools would not be closer to residents than their own cars. Thus 
hubs should contain elements of both circular and linear value creation. As developers 
and planners continued to plan, CBMs came to center on hubs, as tension between 
sustainability aspirations and developers’ perception of realism continued: 
First, as mentioned, developers protested plans to separate linear and circular elements 
and put parking outside Santalodge, Y2 explained: “I think 300 meters is reasonable. That 
is where you can have your parking. But if it is 600 or 700 meters – it may not sound much 
but it is damn far. And you are to walk there every morning.”  
Second, developers problematized the idea to have houses built entirely without parking, 
although zero-parking houses represent the “cutting edge”:  
A zero parking project – how to we handle it in X years when we see that it does not work? 
When we have already built a parking house, I do not see the long-term perspective with 
this type of goal. It is show-off, I cannot see that it is feasible over time. We have to have a 
base, parking between 0,5 and 0.35 [spaces per apartment] (Y1) 
 
Thus a decision was made to have 0.5 parking spaces per apartment and one (1) pool car 
per 50 apartments. The first hub built, meant to service 800 apartments would thus 
mainly contain regular parking (400 spaces).  
Subsequently it is perhaps understandable that the business model-group became 
primarily devoted to figure out how to build the house, difficult because, as Y3 explained: 
“The problem is that we don’t know if and when we will get land, we cannot pay for 
building the hub before we have our land deals, and those could take five years to 
complete”.  
After four months, X2 frustrated exclaimed: “And here is the parrot again – don’t forget 
the mobility services!”.  Being satisfied that they had come up with an idea of how to 
build the thing, developers now participated in planners initiative to describe hubs’ 
circular elements as well. Yet, after complaining that Burg has taken control again, after 
another four months it was time to, again, focus on the economic side of things, as Y2 
explained: “The stress is almost unhealthy” and that “We have to focus on the economic 
sustainability, otherwise this all ends up as just fancy ideas”. Focused now turned to value 
capture.    
 Value capture. The costs of the CBM stem primarily from the physical 
construction of parking spaces, both for private cars and for pool ones. Construction costs 
vary quite a lot, depending on how fancy the hub should look, but developers were 
convinced that they could build at 150-200 thousand SEK for each space. Thus a hub with 
400 spaces would cost between 60 Million and 80 Million SEK to build, not a negligible 
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cost, and if each space cost 200 thousand, at 0.5 spaces per apartment, apartment prices 
would increase by 100 thousand because of the hub.  
With costs fairly known, the big question was now the revenue model:  
1) Developers could pay a large sum upfront, enough to both build the hub and establish 
to a mobility fund to subsidize residents’ membership and use of vehicle pools. Both 
planners and developers believed that residents would not just by themselves use the 
pool if there were no incentives. On the other hand they assumed that demand for 
parking was stable, in other words, they did not themselves believe that the market really 
wanted what they offered, but still Y1 believed that “in the long run car pools will sustain 
themselves”.  
2) Developers could pay less upfront and instead use monthly revenues from parking to 
pay both for construction costs and the mobility fund, Y1 explained: “200 per space, we 
pay some of it upfront and then make monthly parking rent expensive. We charge car 
owners a substantial amount so that we can built a mobility fund for the future”.  
Thus in both these revenue models car owners would subsidize circular services, in other 
words, for the model to work there would have to be enough conventional car parking to 
provide revenues. But if residents’ relative demand for pool vehicles grew then these 
would need less subsidies and conventional parking spaces could be “turned” into pool 
ones. However, the apparent risk was that it could go the other way,  if car pools end up 
unused then residents may want to turn their space into ordinary car parking instead. This 
pointed to the risk of future ownership, what would happen to their aspirations when 
things had been built and they would move on to other projects.  
Primarily, the choice between the two models depended on who would own the hub. 
Either it would be turned over to residents, who would then own and manage the hub via 
an elected residential board, or it would be built and owned by some external parking 
company. The latter worried Y1:  
It feels really awkward. I cannot from [My company] send away millions to Parkhub, there 
has to be some security for my condo residents that they will be able to use [the hub] for 25 
years.[…] When we tried to squeeze the quy (Parkhub representative) he would not reveal 
anything. We need to sit down and look at their business, how they can guarantee things, 
after all we are going to give them 50 Million. 
 
On the other hand neither planners nor developers trusted residents to be professional 
enough to be able to manage the hub with its dual linear and circular elements:  
We cannot have 10 different condo associations trying to figure out management for 
themselves […] how to make it work in practice with pool cars, maintenance, who cleans 
and has the keys? We have to have a finalized, safe, solution. Buy it from someone, don’t 
make it difficult. If we expect that the condo associations will handle all of this, it will 
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generate so much negative media attention so then it is better for my company to stay out 
of it.(Y1) 
 
For three months planners, and in particular developers, racked their brains, but then Y1 
thought he found a solution: “I have tried to weigh everything we have said together, and 
an idea have started to emerge, that I think would work both for the building and running 
the hub”. His idea was for developers to build the hub and then commission Burg’s 
parking company, an actor they all trusted, to manage its funds and operations on behalf 
of Santalodge’s residents. That would take care of the ownership risks. Nonetheless, after 
almost two years of high-stress cooperation the group had made several important 
decisions regarding value creation and value capture at least for the first hubs to be built.  
DISCUSSION 
In this paper we set out to explore and explain how business and public actors work 
together to develop CBMs. Our review of the literature led us to focus on joint efforts as a 
process consisting of two parts: coordination and cooperation, shaped by rules, norms 
and understandings. Below we tentatively discuss our observations.  
The CBM literature is pervaded by a stubborn insistence on the business model canvas as 
key for understanding CBM development and the inter-organizational relationships it 
entails. The canvas portrays relationships in a static way, as being about exchange. This 
seems like a gross over-simplification, what appears is instead a process fraught with 
tensions, learning and, sometimes creativity, energized by those underpinning 
institutional frictions that fuel corporate sustainability at large. 
Public-private CBM development as motivated by institutional 
frictions 
Institutions are suggested to particularly matter for CBM development because this 
development goes beyond mere matters of competitive advantage, aiming also for social, 
environmental and economic integration (Fehrer and Wieland, 2021). In our case we show 
how this mattering surfaces in two ways:  
First, CBM development is embedded within a joint effort that comes about out of 
experiences of institutional misalignments, a frustration over the difficulty to achieve 
sustainability results via the inter-organizational relationships and roles prescribed by the 
law. As Bryson and colleagues (2015) observe in their many studies of private-public 
partnerships, experiences of failure often motivated actors to engage in cooperation to 
make up for the short-comings of single sector approaches. Thus public-private CBM 
development occurs in a context of partners trying to challenge institutions, research 
needs to consider that CBM development has this meaning. It makes public-private CBM 
development extra challenging, as it needs not only to deal with the many challenges that 
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CBM development represents, but also has to cope with the challenges that comes with 
challenging institutions.  
Second, CBM development is not only characterized by such above-mentioned motives 
but is also understood as a solution to institutional frictions: CBMs are examples of 
business models for sustainability (Schaltegger, Luedeke-Freund and Hansen, 2016) and as 
such represent, for actors, this quest for “win-wins”, for being able to integrate social, 
environmental and economic objectives. Thus ingrained in CBM development is this hope 
of coming to terms with another type of institutional tensions, between the normative 
aspirations of sustainability and the perceived economic realities of doing business in a 
market (Stål and Bonnedahl, 2016; Stål, 2018).  
Public-private CBM development as permeated by institutional 
friction 
Our second observation is that while the business model-literature, just like the planners 
and developers we examined, hope for creative ways to combine the moral and the 
pragmatic, and finding these “win-wins”, in practice CBM development turns out to be 
laden with tensions, trade-offs and potential conflicts, demanding hard work to soldier 
through numerous issues and decisions without losing pace, energy or determination. 
These efforts can be highly emotional, and are just as much about creativity as about 
needing to be systematically worked through, as creative solutions often fail to 
materialize themselves. It is about stamina and perseverance, just as much as about 
creativity and genius. Institutional frictions do not end as CBM development beings, they 
pervade its entire process. Through the multiple issues and details that must be decided 
institutional frictions repeatedly get new chances to manifest themselves and come 
“alive”. This process is as much about “win-wins” as it is about endless bargaining as 
partners try to have each other to assume responsibility for costs and responsibilities. Yet 
at the same time there is learning, as partners oscillate move between common and 
private interests, helping and tricking each other, sometimes honestly trying to solve the 
problems at hand.  
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